CHAMBERLAIN: Yes, the Alaska “Decoy Dan” Scheme Can Be Prosecuted: 18 U.S.C. § 241

AI-written summary of Will Chamberlain, X Article, October 29, 2026. Read the original: x.com/willchamberlain/status/2115990256725950769

Follow Will Chamberlain: X (@willchamberlain)

About the Author

Will Chamberlain is an American attorney and conservative commentator who serves as senior counsel at the Article III Project and vice president for external affairs at the Edmund Burke Foundation. A Georgetown Law graduate who practiced at Quinn Emanuel, he revived Human Events, the nation's oldest conservative magazine, in 2019 and served as its publisher and editor-in-chief.

Quick Context

18 U.S.C. § 241 is a Reconstruction-era federal law that makes it a crime for two or more people to conspire to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate" anyone in the free exercise of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law, and the right to vote is one of those rights. The "Decoy Dan" scheme refers to the reported effort to put a second candidate named Dan Sullivan on the ballot against Sen. Dan Sullivan, which critics call ballot stacking. When Chamberlain calls the case "colorable," he means there is a legitimate legal basis to bring it, not that a conviction is certain; a "circuit split" means federal appeals courts have reached different answers on a question.

The Big Idea

Attorney Will Chamberlain argues that the reported effort by Mary Peltola's Senate campaign aides to put a second "Dan Sullivan" on Alaska's ballot is not merely unethical but potentially prosecutable as a federal conspiracy against rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241. He walks through each element of the statute and rebuts the common claims that nothing illegal happened.

Key Points

• The piece relies on New York Times reporting from October 28 about the alleged recruitment of a same-name candidate; Chamberlain names operative Jerid Kurtz, candidate Daniel J. Sullivan Jr., and former chief of staff Anton McParland as potential defendants, and says Peltola herself could be charged only if evidence showed she joined the agreement.
• He reads the statute's word "injure" to cover deceiving voters about whom they are voting for, citing United States v. Saylor (1944), United States v. Stone (1911), and the district court ruling in United States v. Mackey (2023).
• On intent, he points to text messages and the account of former campaign manager Elisa Rios as reported by the Times.
• He argues the crime is the agreement itself, so it does not matter whether any voter was actually fooled.
• He rejects the objections that ballot stacking is routine, that the Alaska Supreme Court allowed the candidate, that prosecution would punish speech, and that the source retracted.
• He concludes the case is "colorable" but not open-and-shut, since appellate courts have not settled some questions.

Important Details and Numbers

• Penalty under § 241, per the quoted statute: fines, up to 10 years in prison, or both.
• Chamberlain cites a CBS News report (October 29) that a DOJ official named §§ 241 and 242 as "potential roads for prosecutorial action," while the department was not aware of any confirmed mistaken votes.
• He notes a circuit split on whether § 241 requires an overt act (citing United States v. Crochiere, 1st Cir. 1997).
• These are allegations drawn from press reporting. No one has been charged, and everyone named is presumed innocent.

Why It's Here

What makes this worth reading is that Chamberlain doesn't stop at "this is wrong." He walks through the statute, the cases, and the objections, and he admits where the law is unsettled, which is the kind of transparent reasoning the Ledger tries to practice. His test is the conduct, not the party, and that's the right rule whichever campaign is accused. It's here because it's the clearest explanation yet of what the law actually says about the Alaska ballot fight.

"There's a colorable prosecution here and anybody who tells you otherwise hasn't read the cases." (Will Chamberlain)